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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of asset liquidity on the valuation of corporate
securities and the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing decisions. I show that asset liquidity increases debt
capacity only when bond covenants restrict the disposition of assets. By contrast, I
demonstrate that, with unsecured debt, greater liquidity increases credit spreads on
corporate debt and reduces optimal leverage. The model also determines the extent to
which pledging assets increases ﬁrm value and relates the optimal size of the pledge to
ﬁrm and industry characteristics. Finally, I show that asset liquidity and security
provisions may help explain leverage ratios and credit spreads observed in practice.
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of asset liquidity on the values of
corporate securities and the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing decisions. Throughout the paper,
asset liquidity is deﬁned as the ease with which the ﬁrm’s assets can be sold
on a secondary market. Because higher liquidity may increase ﬁrm value in
liquidation, the traditional view is that liquidity increases debt capacity (see,
e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1992).1 However, as argued by Weiss and Wruck
(1998), ‘‘unless a credible promise can be made not to engage in asset stripping,
[...] asset liquidity [could] reduce, not increase, a ﬁrm’s ability to issue debt
securities’’. I contend in this paper that liquidity increases debt capacity only
when bond covenants impose restrictions on the disposition of assets. In
particular, I show that when the ﬁrm’s assets are pledged as collateral to the
debt contract, greater liquidity reduces credit spreads on corporate debt and
increases optimal leverage. By contrast, I demonstrate that when the bond
indenture does not include security provisions, the opposite is true. The model
determines the extent to which pledging assets distorts the ﬁrm’s operating
policy and reduces the cost of debt ﬁnancing. As a result, I am able to derive
the optimal size of the pledge and to relate it to ﬁrm and industry
characteristics such as asset productivity and demand uncertainty. Finally, I
show that asset liquidity can help explain the leverage ratios and credit spreads
observed in practice.
The imperfect competition model I develop in this article builds on earlier
work on capacity choice.2 I consider an economy with a ﬁrm having exclusive
access to a project that yields a stochastic continuous stream of cash ﬂows. The
ﬁrm is levered because debt allows it to shield part of its operating proﬁts from
taxation. However, leverage is limited because debt ﬁnancing increases the
likelihood of costly ﬁnancial distress. To measure the eﬀects of asset liquidity
on the values of corporate securities, I assume that the stream of cash ﬂows
generated by assets in place is directly related to current ﬁrm size. Uncertainty
is represented by the demand shift parameter for the good produced by the ﬁrm
and, consequently, both the rate of cash ﬂow accrual and the rate of asset sales
are driven by its variations.
The paper derives simple valuation formulas for debt and equity when the
ﬁrm’s assets are divisible and liquid. Because of asset liquidity, valuable
options to reduce capacity arise when economic conditions worsen. In the
model, the proceeds from capacity reductions are used either to pay debt
service when the ﬁrm is in distress or to pay dividends when the ﬁrm is solvent.
However, management, acting in the best interest of shareholders, sells assets
1Myers and Rajan (1998) show in a related paper that greater liquidity reduces the ability of the
borrower to commit to a speciﬁc course of action and, hence, its debt capacity.
2See, for example, Pindyck (1988) and Abel and Eberly (1996).
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only when asset sales maximize the value of equity. As a result, equity value
comprises the expected present value of the cash ﬂow to be received plus a
continuum of options to reduce capacity and the option to exit the industry.
The model endogenously determines both the default threshold and the sales
curve that maximize equity value. Because of the limited liability principle,
shareholders have the option to default on their obligations. The optimal
exercise policy for this option is to default when the ﬁrm has negative economic
net worth. As a result, shareholders inject capital to ﬁnance continued operation
of the ﬁrm whenever it is solvent on a stock basis but insolvent on a ﬂow basis.
Asset liquidity expands the strategy space open to the borrower by allowing
it to sell assets to meet coupon payments. Asset sales are optimal for
shareholders whenever their marginal valuation of capital is lower than the
selling price of assets. At the same time, asset sales are in the best interest of the
ﬁrm because their proceeds exceed the marginal revenue product generated by
capital. Thus, when the ﬁrm is solvent, asset sales increase ﬁrm value by
allocating assets to better uses. When the ﬁrm is in distress, asset sales represent
for the ﬁrm the cheapest source of funds. Moreover, asset sales allow the ﬁrm
to ﬁnance continued operation of its remaining assets without requiring capital
injections by shareholders, thereby increasing equity value. In the meantime,
however, asset sales reduce the value of corporate debt by reducing ﬁrm size
upon closure as well as the average lifetime of assets in place. In a rational
expectations model, bondholders anticipate the decrease in the value of their
claims and the corporate spread adjusts to yield a normal compensation.
The net eﬀect of asset liquidity on ﬁrm value results from a trade-oﬀ between
the increase in equity value and the reduction in debt value. When the value of
the operating ﬂexibility provided by asset liquidity is lower than the decrease in
debt value, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to pledge assets by issuing secured debt.3
When the reverse is true, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to issue unsecured debt.
Therefore, contrary to models in which the level of asset sales is exogenous (see
e.g. Leland, 1994), our model predicts that bond covenants pledging assets as
collateral can reduce ﬁrm value by inducing overinvestment in unproductive
assets. The model also shows that the value maximizing policy consists in
pledging part of the ﬁrm’s assets and that the optimal size of the pledge
depends on ﬁrm and industry characteristics such as asset productivity and
demand uncertainty.
The closed-form results I obtain for the values of equity and debt also allow
for an investigation of the eﬀects of asset liquidity on optimal leverage. Because
ﬁrm size upon closure depends on the willingness of the ﬁrm to sell assets,
3Although the analysis focuses on secured debt, other types of bond covenants relying, for
example, on balance sheet ratios such as book debt=book assets would yield the same investment
policy for the ﬁrm and, hence, would have the same implications for asset values and the ﬁrm policy
choices.
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higher liquidity reduces the ﬁrm’s ability to issue debt. Moreover, because asset
sales raise the value of equity whereas they reduce debt value, the optimal
leverage ratio is reduced. The model yields an explanation for the failure of the
contingent claims analysis to replicate the low debt levels and high credit
spreads observed in practice. Incorporating possible asset sales and security
provisions in the model results in an increase of 10–30% of default spreads
and, at the same time, a decrease of 30–60% of optimal leverage.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the
value of the unlevered ﬁrm and discusses the moral hazard problems associated
with debt ﬁnancing. Section 3 presents a model of the levered ﬁrm where ﬁrm
size is ﬁxed. It also relates debt and equity values to ﬁrm and industry
characteristics. Section 4 allows the ﬁrm to adjust its production capacity to
economic conditions and investigates the eﬀects of asset liquidity on leverage
decisions and ﬁrm value. Section 5 introduces secured debt and analyses its
eﬃciency implications. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. The model
2.1. Assumptions
Throughout the paper, capital markets are perfect with no transaction costs
and equal access to information for all investors. The default-free term
structure is ﬂat with an instantaneous riskless rate r at which investors may
lend and borrow freely.
I consider an inﬁnitely lived ﬁrm producing output with its capital stock k. I
assume for simplicity that the good produced by the ﬁrm is not storable so that
output equals demand. The ﬁrm is initially ﬁnanced by standard equity.
Management acts in the best interests of shareholders. Corporate taxes are paid
at a rate t on operating proﬁt, and full oﬀsets of corporate losses are allowed.
The ﬁrm’s instantaneous operating proﬁt is given by
pðxt; kÞ ¼ ax
g
t k
1@g@c; ð1Þ
where gA0; 1½; a > 0; c > 0 and ðxtÞtX0 is a demand shift parameter.
4 In this
equation, axgt k
1@g accounts for the ﬂow of revenues minus variable costs and c
is a constant ﬂow cost per period. For the remainder of the paper, ðxtÞtX0 is
ruled by the process
xT ¼ xt expfðm@s2=2ÞðT@tÞ þ sðZT@ZtÞgX0; xt > 0; ð2Þ
where m and s are constant parameters and ðZtÞtX0 is a Brownian motion
deﬁned on a ﬁltered probability space ðO;F;P; ðFtÞtX0Þ.
4When c ¼ 0, Eq. (1) approximates the proﬁt function of a ﬁrm using a Cobb-Douglas
production technology and facing an isoelastic demand curve (see Section A.5 of Appendix A).
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Although its assets may be operated forever, the ﬁrm can also choose to
abandon them or to reduce its production capacity. I assume hereafter that
these decisions are irreversible. As a result, they may be viewed as the decision
to liquidate the ﬁrm or, alternatively, to liquidate marginal units of capital. I
denote the abandonment value of the ﬁrm by Aðx; kÞ and the constant selling
price of assets by l.5 Aðx; kÞ represents the traditional measure of liquidity (used
for example by Shleifer and Vishny (1992)). It depends on the current state of
the industry, x, and current ﬁrm size, k. l represents a second measure of
liquidity which is relevant over the entire life of the ﬁrm. Obviously, the
relation between Aðx; kÞ and l, i.e. between the price the ﬁrm gets for its capital
upon abandonment and the price it gets now, is critical to the decision whether
to sell assets now or to hold on to them.
2.2. Value of the unlevered ﬁrm
Before analyzing the impact of debt ﬁnancing on ﬁrm value, it will be useful
to identify the sources of value within the ﬁrm. The value of the unlevered ﬁrm
is given by a combination of the value of assets in place and the values of the
real options available to management. In particular, ﬁrm value is equal to the
sum of the value of a perpetual right to the current ﬂow of income and the
values of the options to reduce capacity and abandon operations. These
options can be described as follows:
1. The option to abandon the ﬁrm’s assets consists of one irreversible switch
that occurs the ﬁrst time the state variable reaches the abandonment
threshold. This decision trades oﬀ the expected present value of the cash
ﬂows associated with operation of the ﬁrm’s assets with the abandonment
value of the ﬁrm.
2. The contraction options consist of a sequence of irreversible switches. These
switches take place at contraction thresholds that depend on the contempora-
neous production capacity of the ﬁrm. The optimal contraction policy trades oﬀ
the marginal decrease in the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt with the selling price of assets.
I denote by Ty the ﬁrst passage time of ðxtÞtX0 at y and by E
x0 the expectation
operator associated with the probability measure P conditional on x starting at
the level x0. If agents are risk neutral,
6 the value of the abandonment option for
5The model can be extended to the case in which the selling price of assets depends on the state of
the industry x. However, such an extension does not yield more insights on the economics of the
problem.
6When agents are risk averse, the probability measure can be changed using Cameron-Martin–
Girsanov theorem to develop the analysis in a risk-neutral economy (see Harrison and Pliska,
1981). This alternative approach, which relies on the dynamic completeness of ﬁnancial markets, is
used by He and Pindyck (1992) in a model in which ﬁrms are characterized by a technology similar
to mine.
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a given abandonment threshold xaðkaÞ can be written as
7
AðxaðkaÞ; kaÞE
x0 ½e@rTxa ðka Þ @ð1@tÞEx0
ZþN
Txa ðka Þ
e@rupðxu; kaÞ du
2
64
3
75; ð3Þ
in which Ty ¼ infftX0: xt ¼ yg and ka is the production capacity upon
abandonment. The ﬁrst term of this expression represents the expected
abandonment value of the ﬁrm discounted between the expected exit time and
the current date. The second term accounts for the expected present value of
the cash ﬂows that the assets of the ﬁrm would have generated if the ﬁrm had
not abandoned them.
The value of the contraction options can be written in the same fashion. For
any given set of contraction thresholds xlðkÞ, the value of these options is
deﬁned by
Zka
k
lEx0 ½e@rTxl ðkÞ @ð1@tÞEx0
ZþN
Txl ðkÞ
e@rupkðxu;kÞ du
2
64
3
75
0
B@
1
CAdk; ð4Þ
in which pkð : Þ is the instantaneous marginal revenue product of capital.
According to this speciﬁcation, the ﬁrm can reduce its capacity from k to ka.
Each capacity reduction entitles the ﬁrm to the selling price of assets l. In the
same time, ﬁrm size and the expected cash ﬂows from continuing operation are
reduced marginally.
Combining the values of these real options with the value of a perpetual
entitlement to the current ﬂow of income gives the value of the ﬁrm as
vaðx; kÞ ¼ ð1@tÞE
x0
ZþN
0
e@rupðxu; kÞ du
2
4
3
5
þ AðxaðkaÞ; kaÞE
x0 ½e@rTxa ðka Þ @ð1@tÞEx0
ZþN
Txa ðka Þ
e@rupðxu; kaÞ du
2
64
3
75
þ
Zka
k
lEx0 ½e@rTxl ðkÞ @ð1@tÞEx0
ZþN
Txl ðkÞ
e@rupkðxu;kÞ du
2
64
3
75
0
B@
1
CAdk:
ð5Þ
7Future revenues are expected to grow at the rate mgþ gðg@1Þs2=2. Therefore, the integrals
deﬁned below to converge to a ﬁnite solution only if r > mgþ gðg@1Þs2=2. Also, note that I
implicitly assume that the manager makes policy choices that generate positive values for the real
options available to the ﬁrm.
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The ﬁrst best contraction policy consists in selecting the contraction
thresholds that maximize ﬁrm value. Therefore, the optimal contraction
thresholds satisfy the high-contact conditions (see Dumas, 1991)
@2vaðx;kÞ
@k@x

x¼xlðkÞ
¼ 0 for kA½ka; k: ð6Þ
Solving these equations yields the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume that the instantaneous proﬁt function of the ﬁrm is
described by Eqs. ð1Þ and ð2Þ. When the ﬁrm is unlevered; its value satisﬁes for
k > ka
vaðx; kÞ ¼ Pðx; kÞ þ pðk; kaÞ þ ½AðxaðkaÞ; kaÞ@PðxaðkaÞ; kaÞðx=xaðkaÞÞ
W;
ð7Þ
in which
Pðxt; kÞ ¼ ð1@tÞE
xt
ZN
t
e@rðu@tÞpðxu; kÞ du
2
4
3
5 ð8Þ
and b ¼ ðm@s2=2Þ=s; l ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2rþ b2
p
and W ¼@ðbþ lÞ=s. In Eq. ð8Þ; pðk; kaÞ
accounts for the value of the options to reduce ﬁrm size from k to ka. It is equal to
pðk; kaÞ ¼
gl
ðg@WÞð1@WÞ
ðkðx=xlðkÞÞ
W@kaðx=xlðkaÞÞ
WÞ: ð9Þ
The abandonment and contraction thresholds satisfy Eq. ð6Þ. Firm size upon
abandonment is deﬁned by xaðkaÞ ¼ xlðkaÞ.
Proof. See Appendix A. &
To determine the optimal abandonment policy, the abandonment value of the
ﬁrm must be speciﬁed further. For simplicity, I assume that the abandonment
value of unlevered assets is given by a constant L (possibly equal to kal). This
assumption implies that the optimal abandonment threshold satisﬁes
@vaðx; kaÞ
@x

x¼xaðkaÞ
¼ 0: ð10Þ
The following results.
Proposition 2. Assume that the abandonment value of the unlevered ﬁrm is given
by a constant L. Then; the abandonment threshold is given by
xaðkaÞ ¼
W
W@g
ð1@tÞcþ rL
ð1@tÞraðkaÞ
1@g r@gm@gðg@1Þ
s2
2
  1=g
: ð11Þ
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Moreover; the production capacity of the ﬁrm upon abandonment satisﬁes
kal ¼ ð1@gÞ ð1@tÞ
c
r
þ L
h i
ð12Þ
and the contraction policy is described by
xlðkÞ ¼
W
W@g
lðr@mg@gðg@1Þs2=2Þ
ð1@gÞð1@tÞa
 1=g
k; kA½ka; k: ð13Þ
The equation that determines ﬁrm size upon closure can be interpreted as
follows. The left-hand side of Eq. (12) is the shadow value of assets in place.
The right-hand side is the opportunity cost of remaining active adjusted for
asset productivity, 1@g (the higher the productivity of assets in place, the
larger ﬁrm size upon closure). Note that while ﬁrm size upon closure is
increasing in Aðx; kÞ ¼ L, it is decreasing in l. Sections 3 and 4 show that these
two measures of liquidity have a similar impact on the willingness of the
levered ﬁrm to hold on to its assets and, hence, on the value of bondholders’
claim upon default. As a result, increases in Aðx; kÞ increase the ﬁrm’s debt
capacity whereas increases in l decrease the ﬁrm’s ability to issue debt.
Table 1 reports simulation results associated with Propositions 1 and 2.
Parameter values for the base case environment are set as follows: the riskless
Table 1
Table 1 reports comparative statics associated with Propositions 1 and 2. The abandonment value
of the ﬁrm’s assets is given by a constant L. The ﬁrst column gives the value of the unlevered ﬁrm
without the contraction options. The second column gives the value of the unlevered ﬁrm with the
contraction options. The third column reports the relative increase in value resulting from the
contraction options. The fourth column gives ﬁrm size upon exit.
The base case parameters are set as follows: The riskless interest rate r ¼ 6%, the initial size of
the ﬁrm k ¼ 100, the productivity of assets in place g ¼ 0:53, the corporate tax rate t ¼ 15%, the
liquidation value of unlevered assets L ¼ kal, and the selling price of assets in place l ¼ 1. The
proﬁt function is further characterized by m ¼ 0:01; s ¼ 0:2; a ¼ 1; c ¼ 1, and x0 ¼ 1.
Input Value with no Value with Contraction Exit
parameter capacity capacity options size
values adjustment adjustments (%) ka
Base 109.9 130.8 19.0 13
g ¼ 0:50 127.5 139.7 9.6 14
g ¼ 0:56 94.6 128.7 36.0 11
s ¼ 0:15 114.6 134.9 17.7 13
s ¼ 0:25 104.5 128.5 23.0 13
L ¼ 0:5kal 109.9 130.5 18.7 9
L ¼ 0:75kal 109.9 130.6 18.8 10
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interest rate r ¼ 6%, the initial size of the ﬁrm k ¼ 100, the productivity of
assets in place (see Appendix A) g ¼ 0:53, the corporate tax rate t ¼ 15%, and
the liquidation value of unlevered assets L ¼ kal. The proﬁt function is further
characterized by m ¼ 0:01; s ¼ 0:2; a ¼ 1; c ¼ 1, and x0 ¼ 1.
Table 1 reveals that the real options available to the ﬁrm have important
value implications. In the base case environment, for example, the contraction
options increase ﬁrm value by 19%. Table 1 also shows that demand
uncertainty ðsÞ and the productivity of the ﬁrm’s assets ð1@gÞ have a
signiﬁcant impact on the value of these options. As the productivity of assets in
place increases (as g decreases from 0.53 to 0.5), it is more valuable for the ﬁrm
to hold on to its assets. Thus, ﬁrm size upon abandonment increases (from 13
to 14) while the value of the contraction options decreases (from 19% to 36%
of ﬁrm value). Surprisingly, the abandonment value of the ﬁrm’s assets does
not have a large impact on the value of the contraction options. This result
arises because of the low probability of exit in the base case environment.
Propositions 1 and 2 determine ﬁrm value under the abandonment and
contraction policies deﬁned by Eqs. (6) and (10). These policies are optimal in
the sense that they maximize ﬁrm value ex ante. I show below that debt distorts
management’s incentives to follow these policies, thereby creating agency costs
of debt.
2.3. Introducing debt
Because of the tax shield, the ﬁrm has an incentive to issue debt. The design
of the debt contract is essential because it aﬀects the type of moral hazard
problems associated with debt ﬁnancing. I consider in this article inﬁnite
maturity debt contracts, which are characterized by:
1. A perpetual ﬂow of coupon payments s and a commitment that if the ﬁrm
defaults on its obligation to service the debt contract, it is immediately
liquidated. The remaining cash ﬂows from operations accrue to shareholders
(i.e. shareholders have residual income rights).
2. A principal P that shareholders have to pay upon default prior to receiving
any cash ﬂow. (That is, absolute priority is enforced upon default.)
3. Bond covenants that restrict the disposition of the ﬁrm’s assets prior to
default. I consecutively consider covenants preventing the ﬁrm from selling
assets, allowing the ﬁrm to sell its assets, or pledging part of the ﬁrm’s assets
as collateral to the debt contract.
In order to understand the impact of debt ﬁnancing on the ﬁrm policy
choices, it is important to make a clear distinction between the value of equity
ex ante (at the time of the debt issuance) and ex post (once debt has been
issued). The value of equity ex post is given by the present value of the cash
ﬂows accruing to shareholders after the debt has been sold. The value of equity
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ex ante is the sum of the value of equity ex post and the market value of debt at
the time it is issued (i.e. ﬁrm value at that time). The contraction and default
thresholds typically are selected ex post so as to maximize equity value whereas
leverage and bond covenants are selected ex ante so as to maximize ﬁrm value.
As a result, conﬂict of interest may occur between shareholders and
bondholders because management does not follow ex post the contraction
and abandonment policies deﬁned by Eqs. (6) and (10).
3. Fixed capacity and capital structure
Consider ﬁrst the case in which bond covenants prevent the ﬁrm from
adjusting its production capacity to economic conditions. The relevant
measure of liquidity is thus Aðx; kÞ. In this setting, agency costs of debt result
exclusively from an ineﬃcient abandonment decision. Moreover, debt aﬀects
ﬁrm value because it changes both the amount of taxes paid by the ﬁrm and
expected bankruptcy costs. This is the standard case studied, for example, by
Mello and Parsons (1992).
3.1. Valuation of debt and equity
I denote the values of debt and equity claims when the ﬁrm has issued debt
with contractual coupon payment s by dðx; k; sÞ and eðx; k; sÞ. Shareholders
have limited liability and, thus, the option to default on their obligations.8 The
optimal policy for shareholders is to default when the continuation value of
equity is lower than its liquidation value (to be received if and when default
occurs).
I denote the proportional bankruptcy cost incurred upon default by a and
the default threshold selected by shareholders by xdðkÞ. If absolute priority is
enforced, the cash ﬂow to shareholders upon default is
max½ð1@aÞAðxdðkÞ; kÞ@P; 0; ð14Þ
whereas the cash ﬂow to bondholders is
min½ð1@aÞAðxdðkÞ; kÞ;P: ð15Þ
Using the above notations, the values of equity and debt can be written as
the sum of the present value of the cash ﬂows that claimholders receive upon
continuation (until Txd ðkÞ) and the present value cash ﬂow that they receive
8In the model, bankruptcy is triggered instantaneously by the decision of shareholders to cease
injecting funds in the ﬁrm. This condition relies on a stock-based deﬁnition of ﬁnancial distress. A
similar condition can be found in Mello and Parsons (1992) and Leland (1994).
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upon default:
eðx; k; sÞ ¼ ð1@tÞEx0
ZTxd ðkÞ
0
e@ruðpðxu; kÞ@sÞ du
2
64
3
75
þ max½ð1@aÞAðxdðkÞ; kÞ@P; 0E
x0 ½e@rTxd ðkÞ ; ð16Þ
and
dðx; k; sÞ ¼ Ex0
ZTxd ðkÞ
0
e@rus du
2
64
3
75
þ min½ð1@aÞAðxd ðkÞ; kÞ;PE
x0 ½e@rTxd ðkÞ : ð17Þ
Solving these equations yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3. When the instantaneous proﬁt function of the ﬁrm is described by
Eqs. ð1Þ and ð2Þ and bond covenants prevent the ﬁrm from selling assets; ﬁrm
value for a ﬁxed ﬂow of coupon payments s satisﬁes
vðx; k; sÞ ¼ eðx; k; sÞ þ dðx; k; sÞ ð18Þ
in which debt and equity values are; respectively; given by
dðx; k; sÞ ¼ ðs=rÞð1@ðx=xd ðkÞÞ
WÞ
þ min½ð1@aÞAðxd ðkÞ; kÞ;Pðx=xdðkÞÞ
W ð19Þ
and
eðx; k; sÞ ¼Pðx; k; sÞ@PðxdðkÞ; k; sÞðx=xdðkÞÞ
þ max½ð1@aÞAðxdðkÞ; kÞ@P; 0ðx=xdðkÞÞ; ð20Þ
where W is deﬁned as in Proposition 1; and
Pðxt; k; sÞ ¼ ð1@tÞE
xt
ZN
t
e@rðu@tÞðpðxu; kÞ@sÞ du
2
4
3
5: ð21Þ
Proof. See Appendix A. &
Proposition 2 shows that the values of corporate securities depend on ﬁrm and
industry characteristics. The latter are represented by the level and the
instantaneous drift and volatility of the demand shift parameter. The size of the
ﬁrm, its proﬁt function, and its continuation value account for ﬁrm speciﬁcity.
Eq. (19) also shows that, for a given coupon payment s, the value of corporate
debt is strictly increasing in the liquidation value of the ﬁrm, deﬁned as the
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abandonment value of the ﬁrm net of bankruptcy costs. Because credit spreads
on corporate debt are deﬁned by CSðsÞ ¼ ðs=dðx; k; sÞÞ@r, the above argument
implies the following result.
Proposition 4. When bond covenants prevent the ﬁrm from adjusting its
production capacity; higher asset liquidity results in lower credit spreads on
corporate debt and higher leverage ratios.
To characterize the default threshold selected by shareholders, the
abandonment value of the ﬁrm must be speciﬁed further. Following Mello
and Parsons (1992), I assume that, after default, the new owners of the ﬁrm
continue to employ the assets in their current use. Speciﬁcally, the
abandonment value of levered the ﬁrm, AðxdðkÞ; kÞ, equals the unlevered value
of the ﬁrm’s assets:
AðxdðkÞ; kÞ ¼ Pðxd ðkÞ; k; 0Þ@ðPðxaðkÞ; k; 0Þ@LÞðxd ðkÞ=xaðkÞÞ
W; ð22Þ
in which LX0 accounts for the abandonment value of unlevered assets
and xaðkÞ is the abandonment threshold that maximizes the value of
the unlevered ﬁrm. The ﬁrst term of the right-hand side of Eq. (22)
is the value of a perpetual entitlement to the ﬂow of payments generated by
the ﬁrm’s assets when the ﬁrm is unlevered. The second term is the change
occurring in asset value upon default multiplied by the Arrow-Debreu price of
this event.
The abandonment value of the ﬁrm described by Eq. (22) has
important implications for the payoﬀs to claimholders upon default. In
particular, it implies that, under a stock-based deﬁnition of default, share-
holders get nothing upon default if absolute priority is enforced. To see this,
note that the par value of debt at the time of issuance, P, must be larger or
equal to its face value, dðx; k; sÞ. If it were not the case, it would be optimal for
shareholders to default immediately after debt issuance. As as result, if upon
default
eðxdðkÞ; k; sÞ ¼ vðxdðkÞ; k; sÞ@dðxdðkÞ; k; sÞ ¼ 0; ð23Þ
then it is also true that, for aX0,
ð1@aÞAðxd ðkÞ; kÞ@PpvðxdðkÞ; k; sÞ@Pp0: ð24Þ
Therefore, as long as absolute priority is enforced, shareholders do not
internalize the liquidation value of the ﬁrm in their default decision and the
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default threshold xdðkÞ satisﬁes the smooth-pasting condition
9
@eðx; k; sÞ
@x

x¼xd ðkÞ
¼ 0: ð25Þ
Because equity value in a levered ﬁrm ðeðx; k; sÞÞ diﬀers from the value of the
unlevered ﬁrm ðvaðx; kaÞÞ, this default triggering condition diﬀers from the
abandonment condition described by Eq. (10). Therefore, shareholders do not
select ex post the default threshold that maximizes ﬁrm value.
The following Proposition gives the value of corporate securities and
speciﬁes the default policy that maximizes the value of equity under this
speciﬁcation.
Proposition 5. Assume that the abandonment value of the ﬁrm equals the
unlevered value of the ﬁrm’s assets. Then; debt and equity values are; respectively;
given by
dðx; k; sÞ ¼ ðs=rÞð1@ðx=xdðkÞÞ
WÞ þ ð1@aÞAðxdðkÞ; kÞðx=xdðkÞÞ
W; ð26Þ
and
eðx; k; sÞ ¼ Pðx; k; sÞ@Pðxd ðkÞ; k; sÞðx=xd ðkÞÞ
W: ð27Þ
The default threshold that maximizes the value of shareholders’ claim is
deﬁned by
xd ðkÞ ¼
W
W@g
cþ s
rak1@g
r@gm@gðg@1Þ
s2
2
  1=g
: ð28Þ
The abandonment value described in Eq. (22) implies that it is optimal for
shareholders to exercise their option to default when the ﬁrm has negative
economic net worth. Eq. (28) reveals that this occurs when the present value of
the payoﬀs to be received is equal to the opportunity costs of remaining active
multiplied by a factor that represents the value of waiting to default. This
policy implies that shareholders inject capital in the ﬁrm whenever the ﬁrm is
insolvent on a ﬂow basis but solvent on a stock basis. (I show in Section 3 that
the possibility of selling assets allows the borrower to rely on another source of
funds to ﬁnance continued operation of the ﬁrm’s assets.)
Finally, note that eðx; k; sÞ accounts for the value of equity ex post whereas
vðx; k; sÞ represents its value ex ante (at the time of debt issuance). As a result,
although the default threshold is selected (ex post) to maximize eðx; k; sÞ, the
9In general, the abandonment value of the ﬁrm’s assets is determined by the value of these assets
if they were operated by the ﬁrm’s competitors. Eq. (22) reﬂects the implicit assumption that these
competitors use a production technology that can be described by Eq. (1). However, some of the
ﬁrm’s competitors may have access to diﬀerent technologies, allowing them for example to generate
higher cash ﬂows when the state variable is low. In that case, the payoﬀ to shareholders upon
default can be strictly positive.
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amount of debt that the ﬁrm issues (ex ante) maximizes vðx; k; sÞ. Speciﬁcally,
optimal leverage is deﬁned at the time of debt issuance by
s* ¼ argmax
sARþ
vðx; k; sÞ: ð29Þ
3.2. Comparative statics
Simulation results reported in Table 2 are based on Proposition 5.10 In this
table, credit spreads are measured at optimal leverage. The net tax beneﬁt of
debt is given by
NTB ¼
vðx; k; s* Þ@vðx; k; 0Þ
vðx; k; 0Þ
: ð30Þ
Parameter values for the base case environment are set as in Section 2. I further
assume that bankruptcy costs are given by a ¼ 20%.
Simulation results show that optimal leverage and credit spreads depend
on ﬁrm and industry characteristics. In particular, Table 2 reveals that
asset productivity ð1@gÞ and demand uncertainty ðsÞ have a large
impact on ﬁrm value, leverage ratios and credit spreads. The higher the
productivity of the ﬁrm’s assets, the lower the probability of default
and, therefore, the higher the value of corporate debt. By contrast, the
larger demand uncertainty, the higher the interest rate the borrower has
to pay and the lower the gains associated with debt ﬁnancing. I show below
that these two factors also aﬀect the ﬁrm’s decisions regarding the pledging of
collateral.
Simulation results also show that higher liquidity (i.e., a higher liquidation
value of the ﬁrm’s assets) results in higher optimal leverage and lower spreads.
An increase of Aðx; kÞ ¼ L from 50 to 100 raises the optimal leverage from
67.2% to 67.6% and decreases the credit spread from 56 basis points to 45
basis points.
Finally, Table 2 reveals that the model developed in this section suﬀers from
the two main failures of contingent claims models of the ﬁrm. First, for any set
of input parameter values, predicted leverage ratios are far in excess of current
practice. Second, predicted spreads are low given the leverage ratios generated
by the model. In Section 4, I show that allowing the ﬁrm to adjust its
production capacity to economic conditions lowers leverage ratios and, at the
same time, increases corporate spreads.
10The value of the unlevered ﬁrm given in Table 2 does not account for the value of the
contraction options because ﬁrm size is ﬁxed throughout the section. Tables 1, 3 and 4 give the
value of the unlevered ﬁrm when the value of these options is incorporated. The value of the
unlevered ﬁrm is then given by vaðx; kÞ derived in Proposition 1.
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4. Capacity adjustments and capital structure
4.1. Overview
In Section 3, I have presented a model of asset prices in which ﬁrm size is
ﬁxed: Changes in the demand for the good produced by the ﬁrm do not induce
any adjustment in the ﬁrm’s production capacity. An example of this case is a
situation in which bond covenants prevent the ﬁrm from selling its assets.
When the bond indenture includes such debt covenants, assets in place
represent a fair collateral and asset liquidity increases optimal leverage and
reduces credit spreads. However, as noticed by Smith and Warner (1979b),
‘‘one cost associated with ﬂat prohibitions on the sale of particular assets rises
from the fact that the ﬁrm is not permitted to divest itself of those assets whose
value to others is greater than the value to itself’’.
I now relax the assumption that ﬁrm size is ﬁxed until the closure time and
instead allow the ﬁrm to adjust its production capacity over its entire life.
However, following Smith and Warner (1979b, paragraph 2.1.2), I consider
that the debt contract requires that the ﬁrm, ‘‘not otherwise than in the
ordinary course of business, sell, lease, transfer, or otherwise dispose of any
Table 2
Table 2 reports comparative statics associated with Proposition 5. Credit spreads are deﬁned by
CSðsÞ ¼ ðs=dðx; k; sÞÞ@r and are measured at optimal leverage. The net tax beneﬁt of debt is given
by NTB ¼ ½vðx; k; s* Þ@vðx; k; 0Þ=vðx; k; 0Þ. The base case parameters are set as follows: The
riskless interest rate r ¼ 6%, the size of the ﬁrm k ¼ 100, the productivity of assets in place g ¼ 0:53,
the tax advantage of debt t ¼ 15%, liquidation costs a ¼ 20%, and the liquidation value of
unlevered assets L ¼ kl. The proﬁt function is further characterized by m ¼ 0:01; s ¼ 0:2;
a ¼ 1; c ¼ 1, and x0 ¼ 1.
Input Optimal Levered Unlevered Net tax Credit
parameter leverage ﬁrm value ﬁrm value beneﬁt spread
values ð%Þ vðx; k; s* Þ vðx; k; 0Þ ð%Þ ðbpsÞ
Base 67.6 120.8 109.9 9.9 45
g ¼ 0:50 68.2 139.5 127.5 9.4 46
g ¼ 0:56 67.3 105.0 94.6 11.0 39
s ¼ 0:15 72.0 126.0 114.6 10.0 33
s ¼ 0:25 64.7 115.9 104.5 10.0 52
a ¼ 0 81.2 127.5 109.9 16.0 41
a ¼ 0:6 53.1 114.7 109.9 4.4 69
L ¼ 0:5kl 67.2 119.4 109.9 8.6 56
L ¼ 0:75kl 67.4 119.9 109.9 9.1 52
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substantial part of its properties and assets’’. Therefore, although I allow
downward capacity adjustments to ﬁt the demand evolution in the ﬁrm’s
product market, I assume that bond covenants prevent the manager from
selling the ﬁrm’s assets to appropriate ﬁrm value just before declaring
bankruptcy.11 Here again, if default occurs, bondholders receive the abandon-
ment value of the ﬁrm less default costs. Finally, I do not consider upward
capacity adjustments since I am interested in the impact of possible asset sales
on optimal capital structure and ﬁrm value in comparison with the benchmark
model in which ﬁrm size is ﬁxed.12
This section derives two main results. First, I show that ceteris paribus the
possibility of selling assets increases equity value and reduces debt value.
Second, I demonstrate that, depending on ﬁrm and industry characteristics,
imposing restrictions on the disposition of assets may reduce ﬁrm value.
An outline for these implications is as follows. The possibility of selling
assets provides ﬂexibility to the borrower by allowing it to reduce ﬁrm size
when there is an economic downturn. Although these capacity reductions are
irreversible, they raise equity value for two reasons. First, asset sales allow the
ﬁrm to increase dividend payments when it is solvent. Second, they allow the
ﬁrm to ﬁnance continued operation of its remaining assets without requiring
capital injections by shareholders when the ﬁrm is solvent on a stock basis but
insolvent on a ﬂow basis. By contrast, because they decrease the liquidation
value of the ﬁrm and change the timing of default, asset sales reduce the value
of bondholders’ claim. In a rational expectations model, bondholders recognize
the adverse borrower behavior and credit spreads adjust to yield a normal
compensation. As a result, the ﬁrm substitutes equity for debt, thereby
reducing leverage.
The eﬀect of asset sales on ﬁrm value results from a trade-oﬀ between the
decrease in debt value and the value of the operating ﬂexibility provided to the
ﬁrm. As a consequence, it depends on ﬁrm and industry characteristics such as
asset productivity and demand uncertainty.
11When an immediate piecewise liquidation of the ﬁrm just before default is possible, securing
the debt contract gives bondholders title to the pledged assets until the bonds are paid in full (see
Section 5). See also Smith and Warner (1979a, b) and Johnson and Stulz (1985).
12See Abel and Eberly (1996) for an analysis of capacity choice under uncertainty. When upward
capacity adjustments are allowed, the operating ﬂexibility of the ﬁrm is larger. As a result, the
expected present value of the cash ﬂows that claimholders will receive is more important. Because
bondholders have ﬁxed income rights, this increase in operating ﬂexibility has a limited impact on
the value of their claims (the only diﬀerence coming from a larger liquidation value of the ﬁrm
induced by a change in the default policy maximizing shareholders’ wealth). In contrast, the value
of equity raises signiﬁcantly, thereby strengthening the eﬀects of asset liquidity on leverage
decisions and ﬁrm value.
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4.2. Ex post capacity adjustments
Consider that the ﬁrm has a right to adjust its production capacity to
economic conditions and denote the constant selling price of assets by l. The
level of this selling price represents a second measure of liquidity for the ﬁrm’s
asset, i.e., the ease with which they can be sold on a secondary market over the
entire life of the ﬁrm.
In order to determine the eﬀects of capacity adjustments on the values of
corporate securities, the path of ﬁrm size through time must be characterized.
Because management acts in the best interests of shareholders, this path
depends on the contraction policy that maximizes equity value. The optimal
contraction policy for shareholders is to sell assets whenever their marginal
valuation of capital is lower than the resale value of assets. Thus, depending on
the sale price l, it may be optimal to sell part of the ﬁrm’s assets before xdðkÞ is
reached. In this light, one can think of equity value as comprising the expected
present value of the cash ﬂow to be received plus a continuum of options to
reduce capacity and the option to exit the industry.
I denote the value of equity in this new setting by elðx; k; sÞ and ﬁrm size
upon closure by kl (determined endogenously below). Since the ﬁrm can adjust
capacity before declaring default, equity value satisﬁes
elðx; k; sÞ ¼ ð1@tÞE
x0
ZþN
0
e@ruðpðxu; kÞ@sÞ du
2
4
3
5
@ ð1@tÞEx0
ZþN
Txd ðkl Þ
e@ruðpðxu; kÞ@sÞ du
2
64
3
75
þ max½ð1@aÞAðxdðklÞ; klÞ@P; 0E
x0 ½e@rTxd ðkl Þ 
þ
Zkl
k
lEx0 ½e@rTxl ðyÞ @ð1@tÞEx0
ZþN
Txl ðkÞ
e@rupkðxu;kÞdu
2
64
3
75
0
B@
1
CA dk:
ð31Þ
In Eq. (31), the ﬁrst term of the right-hand side is the unlimited liability value
of the payoﬀs to be received by shareholders. The second and third terms
represent the value of the option to exit the industry. The fourth term accounts
for the value of the options to reduce capacity. Eq. (31) suggests that the
proceeds from asset sales accrue to shareholders. However, because share-
holders only have residual income rights, these proceeds are used by the ﬁrm to
pay debt service and cover operating losses when the ﬁrm is insolvent on a ﬂow
basis but solvent on a stock basis.
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For any given current production capacity k, kA½kl ; k, the optimal sales
curve xlðkÞ deﬁning the contraction policy satisﬁes the high-contact condition
@2elðx; k; sÞ
@k@x

x¼xlðkÞ
¼ 0: ð32Þ
This condition is similar to Eq. (7). However, the contraction policy that
maximizes equity value diﬀers from the one that maximizes the value of the
unlevered ﬁrm because ﬁrm size upon closure depends on the debt service
selected by shareholders. Solving this equation yields
xlðkÞ ¼
W
W@g
lðr@mg@gðg@1Þs2=2Þ
ð1@gÞð1@tÞa
 1=g
k: ð33Þ
The contraction policy described by Eq. (33) shows that it is optimal to
reduce capacity when the proﬁt generated by the marginal capital unit equals
its adjusted selling price ðW=ðW@gÞÞl. A simple analogy with option pricing
theory reveals that this adjustment in the selling price accounts for the
diﬀerence between the exercise boundary of the option allowing the ﬁrm to
adjust capacity and the selling price of assets (the strike price). As usual for
American options, the ﬁrm should not exercise its real options as soon as they
are in the money.
Also, when Eq. (33) obtains and the ﬁrm is in distress, asset sales are in the
best interest of the ﬁrm since the net sale proceeds exceed the present value of
the cash ﬂows from continued operation of the marginal capital unit. Asset
sales represent the cheapest source of funds for the ﬁrm and are used to ﬁnance
continued operation of the ﬁrm’s remaining assets (see Lang et al., 1995, for
empirical evidence).
Finally, consistent with the empirical study by Maksimovic and Phillips
(1998), Eq. (33) relates asset sales to demand conditions, represented by the
parameters determining the path of the demand shock, and to ﬁrm
characteristics, such as asset productivity and current ﬁrm size.
4.3. Valuation of corporate securities
When the initial production capacity k is larger than kl, asset sales aﬀect debt
value because they reduce ﬁrm size upon default and increase the probability of
default. Since ﬁrm size upon default and the default probability depend on
observable factors, bondholders can anticipate the reduction in the value of
their claims stemming from asset sales. As a result, for any given coupon
payment, the payoﬀs to claimholders upon closure no longer depend on current
ﬁrm size but on kl. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Assume that input parameter values are such that k > kl. When
the ﬁrm is endowed with the possibility of selling assets and its instantaneous
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proﬁt function is described by Eqs. ð1Þ and ð2Þ; the value of the ﬁrm for a ﬁxed
ﬂow of coupon payments s satisﬁes
vlðx; k; sÞ ¼ elðx; k; sÞ þ dlðx; k; sÞ; ð34Þ
where the values of corporate debt and equity are respectively given by
dlðx; k; sÞ ¼ ðs=rÞð1@ðx=xdðklÞÞ
WÞ
þ min½ð1@aÞAðxdðklÞ; klÞ;Pðx=xdðklÞÞ
W ð35Þ
and
elðx; k; sÞ ¼Pðx; k; sÞ þ pðk; klÞ@PðxdðklÞ; kl ; sÞðx=xdðklÞÞ
W
þ max½ð1@aÞAðxdðklÞ; klÞ@P; 0ðx=xdðklÞÞ
W: ð36Þ
In Eq. ð36Þ; pðk; klÞ accounts for the value of the options to reduce ﬁrm size from
k to kl and is given by
pðk; klÞ ¼
gl
ðg@WÞð1@WÞ
ðkðx=xlðkÞÞ
W@klðx=xlðklÞÞ
WÞ: ð37Þ
The contraction thresholds satisfy Eq. ð33Þ. Firm size upon default is deﬁned by
xdðklÞ ¼ xlðklÞ. When input parameter values are such that kpkl ; the values of
debt and equity are deﬁned as in Proposition 3.
Proof. See Appendix A. &
Eq. (36) from Proposition 6 shows that the strategy space open to the
borrower by the possibility of selling assets increases equity value in
comparison with Eq. (21). As mentioned earlier, asset sales allow the borrower
(1) to increase dividend payments when the ﬁrm is solvent and (2) to ﬁnance
continued operation of the ﬁrm’s assets without requiring capital injections by
shareholders when it is in ﬁnancial distress. By contrast, Eq. (35) shows that
asset sales reduce debt value in comparison with Eq. (20) by (1) increasing the
default probability and (2) decreasing ﬁrm size upon default.13 Thus, when the
borrower can adjust its production capacity to economic conditions, optimal
leverage is reduced.
In order to characterize the default policy that maximizes the value of equity,
the abandonment value of the ﬁrm must be speciﬁed further. Following Section
3, I assume that the abandonment value of the ﬁrm is given by the unlevered
value of the ﬁrm’s assets. Under this assumption, the default threshold that
13The present value of one dollar contingent on default raises from ðx=xd ðkÞÞ
W to ðx=xd ðklÞÞ
W and
the abandonment value of the ﬁrm’s assets decreases from Aðxd ðkÞ; kÞ to Aðxd ðklÞ; klÞ.
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maximizes the value of equity satisﬁes
@elðx; kl ; sÞ
@x

x¼xd ðkl Þ
¼ 0; ð38Þ
and the following results.
Proposition 7. Assume that the abandonment value of the ﬁrm equals the
unlevered value of the ﬁrm’s assets. Then; the values of corporate debt and equity
satisfy respectively
dlðx; k; sÞ ¼ ðs=rÞð1@ðx=xd ðklÞÞ
WÞ þ ð1@aÞAðxdðklÞ; klÞðx=xdðklÞÞ
W ð39Þ
and
elðx; k; sÞ ¼ Pðx; k; sÞ þ pðk; klÞ@Pðxd ðklÞ; kl ; sÞðx=xdðklÞÞ
W: ð40Þ
The default threshold selected by shareholders is given by
xd ðklÞ ¼
W
W@g
cþ s
raðklÞ
1@g r@gm@gðg@1Þ
s2
2
  1=g
: ð41Þ
Eq. (41) from Proposition 7 can also be written as
aðxdðklÞÞ
gðklÞ
1@g
r@gm@gðg@1Þs2=2
¼
W
W@g
cþ s
r
: ð42Þ
The left-hand side of Eq. (42) is the expected present value of the cash ﬂows
from the ﬁrm’s assets at the default time. The right-hand side is the opportunity
cost of remaining active.
For any given production capacity k, kA½kl ; k, the level of the demand shift
parameter that determines ﬂow based insolvency is deﬁned by
xf ðkÞ ¼
cþ s
ak1@g
h i1=g
bxdðklÞ: ð43Þ
As mentioned earlier, although the contraction policy deﬁned in Eq. (33)
maximizes the value of equity, the proceeds from asset sales are reinjected by
shareholders in the ﬁrm to service the debt obligations whenever the ﬁrm is
insolvent on a ﬂow basis but solvent on a stock basis.
Propositions 6 and 7 show that the impact of asset sales on the values
of corporate securities depends on the strategy space open to the
borrower by asset liquidity. Bond covenants usually prevent the borrower
from liquidating the ﬁrm’s assets just before defaulting. Therefore, manage-
ment can only adjust capacity when the sales curve is higher than the default
threshold, i.e., when xlðkÞXxdðkÞ. Using Eqs. (33) and (41), the following
results.
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Proposition 8. The possibility of selling assets expands the strategy space open to
the borrower and reduces the value of corporate debt whenever current ﬁrm size is
larger than ﬁrm size upon default kl. When the abandonment value of the ﬁrm
equals the unlevered value of the ﬁrm’s assets; ﬁrm size upon default satisﬁes
kll ¼ ð1@gÞð1@tÞ
cþ s
r
: ð44Þ
Propositions 2, 7 and 8 show that when ð1@tÞs ¼ rL, the operating and
contraction policies of the levered ﬁrm are identical to those of the unlevered
ﬁrm. When ð1@tÞs > rL; kl > ka and xd ðklÞ > xaðkaÞ result and leverage
induces overinvestment in unproductive assets and early exit. When
ð1@tÞsorL, the reverse is true: Leverage induces underinvestment in the
ﬁrm’s assets ðklokaÞ and late exit ðxdðklÞoxaðkaÞÞ. Also, observe that the
liquidation value of the ﬁrm does not appear directly in the equation that
determines ﬁrm size upon default, kl. However, optimal leverage s* depends on
this liquidation value and so does ﬁrm size upon default.
4.4. Comparative statics
Simulation results reported in Table 3 are based on Propositions 7 and 8.
These results underline the impact of asset liquidity on the values of corporate
securities and the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing decisions. Table 3 shows that asset liquidity
has a signiﬁcant impact on the capital structure choices of the ﬁrm. In the base
case environment, for example, the possibility of selling assets reduces the
optimal leverage ratio from 67.6% to 29.4%.
Although optimal leverage is lower, credit spreads on corporate debt are
higher when the ﬁrm can sell assets before declaring bankruptcy. As shown in
Proposition 6, asset sales reduce debt value. In a rational expectations model,
bondholders anticipate the opportunistic behavior of shareholders and the
level of credit spreads reﬂects the associated wealth extraction. The increase in
credit spreads is more important when the ﬁrm does not adjust its ﬁnancing
policy. In the base case environment for example, credit spreads are boosted up
to 227 basis points (not shown in the table).
Section 3 shows that when ﬁrm size is ﬁxed, an increase in the liquidation
value of the ﬁrm’s assets increases optimal leverage and reduces credit spreads
(see Table 2). This eﬀects also shows up in Table 3 where increasing L from
0:5kll to kll increases optimal leverage from 28.2% to 29.4% and reduces the
credit spread from 86 basis points to 84 basis points. An increase in the selling
price, l, works in the opposite direction, decreasing the optimal leverage and
increasing spreads. This shows up in the bottom of Table 3, where an increase
of l from 0.8 to 1.2 decreases the optimal leverage from 40.5% to 21% and
increases the credit spread from 80 to 86 basis points.
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The net eﬀect of asset liquidity on ﬁrm value results from a trade-oﬀ between
the increase in equity value and the decrease in debt value. As a result, it
depends on ﬁrm and industry characteristics such as the productivity of assets
in place or demand uncertainty. Therefore, contrary to standard structural
models of the levered ﬁrm (see, e.g., Leland, 1994), the model presented above
predicts that restrictions imposed on the disposition of assets do not always
increase ﬁrm value.14 In particular, when the productivity of assets in place
ð1@gÞ is low, capacity adjustments are more likely to be optimal and, hence,
pledging assets results in overinvestment in unproductive assets. For higher
levels of asset productivity, the net eﬀect on ﬁrm value of restrictions on the
disposition of assets is negatively related to demand uncertainty and ﬁrm size
(i.e. the strategy space open to the borrower) and positively related to the level
of interest rates and the liquidation value of the ﬁrm. Finally, Table 3 also
Table 3
Table 3 reports comparative statics associated with Propositions 7 and 8. Credit spreads are deﬁned
by CSðsÞ ¼ ðs=dðx; k; sÞÞ@r and are measured at optimal leverage. The net tax beneﬁt of debt is
given by NTB ¼ ½vlðx; k; s* Þ@vaðx; kÞ=vaðx; kÞ. The base case parameters are set as follows: The
riskless interest rate r ¼ 6%, the initial size of the ﬁrm k ¼ 100, the productivity of assets in place
g ¼ 0:53, the tax advantage of debt t ¼ 15%, liquidation costs a ¼ 20%, the liquidation value of
unlevered assets L ¼ kl l, and the sale price of assets in place l ¼ 1. The proﬁt function is further
characterized by m ¼ 0:01; s ¼ 0:2; a ¼ 1; c ¼ 1, and x0 ¼ 1.
Input Optimal Levered Unlevered Net tax Credit Closure
parameter leverage ﬁrm value ﬁrm value beneﬁt spread size
values ð%Þ vlðx; k; s* Þ vaðx; kÞ ð%Þ ðbpsÞ kl
Base 29.4 134.2 130.8 2.6 84 25
g ¼ 0:50 37.5 144.6 139.7 3.5 76 33
g ¼ 0:56 22.5 131.1 128.7 1.9 92 19
s ¼ 0:15 33.6 139.7 134.9 3.6 57 27
s ¼ 0:25 25.4 130.8 128.5 1.8 109 22
a ¼ 0 42.0 136.2 130.8 4.1 103 33
a ¼ 0:6 18.6 132.6 130.8 1.4 73 18
l ¼ 0:8 40.5 123.4 118.9 3.8 80 37
l ¼ 1:2 21 154.2 151.5 1.8 86 18
L ¼ 0:5kll 28.2 133.8 130.5 2.5 86 24
L ¼ 0:75kll 28.7 134.0 130.6 2.5 85 24
14 In these models, a lower level of asset sales increases ﬁrm value because a higher leverage ratio
can be supported when more assets remain in the ﬁrm. As a result, Leland ﬁnds that ‘‘ex ante
shareholders (as well as bondholders) beneﬁt from a covenant that prevents the ﬁrm from selling
assets to meet coupon payments’’.
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reveals that, because a higher sale price for assets reduces ﬁrm size upon
closure, shocks to asset liquidity and asset productivity have opposite eﬀects on
the values of corporate securities.
5. Secured debt and optimal capital structure
5.1. Overview
Section 4 shows that, when the bond indenture does not include covenants
restricting the disposition of assets, asset liquidity reduces the value of
bondholders’ claim. As a result, asset liquidity increases the cost of borrowing
by increasing transaction costs imposed on lenders. When ﬁrm and industry
characteristics are such that the value of the operating ﬂexibility associated
with asset liquidity is larger than the reduction in debt value, asset liquidity
increases ﬁrm value. When they are such that the opposite is true, the ﬁrm will
try to lessen these transaction costs by committing not to sell assets. It can do
so credibly by securing the debt contract.15 A debt contract is said to be secured
if the borrower pledges assets as security until the bonds are paid in full. When
debt is secured, the ﬁrm cannot dispose of the pledged assets without
bondholders’ approval.16 Moreover, if the ﬁrm ﬁles for bankruptcy, secured
creditors acquire title to the pledged assets prior to any other claimant.
This section shows that pledging part of the ﬁrm’s assets as collateral to the
debt contract by issuing secured debt increases ﬁrm value. This result is derived
under the assumption that the pledge freezes the assets in their current use. The
secured debt contract generally allows asset sales if the proceeds are used to
pay oﬀ the loan.17 To simplify the analysis, I do not consider this possibility by
assuming that partial repayments of the loan induce transaction costs that are
high enough to destroy value. Allowing partial repayments of the loan prior to
maturity would, however, strengthen the conclusion that it is optimal for the
ﬁrm to pledge part of its assets. Indeed, partial repayments of the loan reduce
both the default probability and wealth transfers from bondholders to
shareholders. Therefore, they decrease the corporate spread and, hence,
increase optimal leverage and ﬁrm value.
15Other contractual devices can achieve the same goal (see footnote 3 a). However, as noted by
Smith and Warner (1979a) and Johnson and Stulz (1985), secured debt is not as expensive to
monitor as other forms of bond covenants.
16Even if the pledged assets are sold by the borrower without bondholders’ approval, the
Uniform Commercial Code ensures that the security interest in the collateral continues after the
sale. Therefore, the security provision lowers the price that other parties will pay for the ﬁrm’s
assets and, hence, limits asset sales and wealth transfers.
17See the sample covenant 3, American Bar Foundation (1971, p. 427).
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Secured debt reduces the interest rate the ﬁrm has to pay to bondholders in
two ways. First, it prevents the ﬁrm from selling assets and thus reduces the
default probability and preserves the liquidation value of the ﬁrm. Second,
bankruptcy costs are reduced in the event of default because of lower
enforcement costs. However, by securing the debt contract the ﬁrm also
reduces its strategy space in terms of operating ﬂexibility. As mentioned
by Smith and Warner (1979b), ‘‘securing debt involves opportunity costs
by restricting the ﬁrm from potentially proﬁtable dispositions of collateral’’.
In my framework, pledging assets as collateral (1) induces overinvestment
in unproductive assets and (2) prevents the ﬁrm from ﬁnancing
continued operation of its assets by selling part of them when it is optimal
to do so.
5.2. Valuation of corporate securities
I denote bankruptcy costs when K capital units are pledged as collateral by
aðKÞ, with aðKÞX0 and @aðKÞ=@Kp0, and the present value of out of pocket
costs associated with the security provision by S. These costs include the
valuation of the collateral, additional bonding and monitoring expenses,
required reports to debtholders, ﬁling fees for administrative registration, and
other administrative expenses.
According to Proposition 2, asset liquidity may result in asset sales so long
as current ﬁrm size is larger than kl. As a result, the contraction policy of the
ﬁrm is aﬀected by the decision of the ﬁrm regarding the pledging of assets
whenever this decision involves more than kl capital units. When K capital
units are pledged as collateral to the debt contract, KA½kl ; k, the value of
equity satisﬁes
eK ðx; k; sÞ ¼ ð1@tÞE
x0
ZTxd ðkl3KÞ
0
e@ru½pðxu; kÞ@s du
2
64
3
75
þ max½ð1@aðKÞÞAðxd ðK3klÞ; ðK3klÞÞ@P; 0Ex0 ½e@rTxd ðK3kl Þ 
þ
Zkl3K
k
lEx0 ½e@rTxl ðyÞ @ð1@tÞEx0
ZþN
Txl ðkÞ
e@rupkðxu; kÞ du
2
64
3
75
0
B@
1
CA dk
ð45Þ
in which kl3K ¼ supðkl ;KÞ.
The following proposition results.
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Proposition 9. When the ﬁrm’s instantaneous proﬁt function is described by
Eqs. ð1Þ and ð2Þ and K units of capital are pledged as collateral to the debt
contract; Kok; the value of the ﬁrm for a ﬁxed ﬂow of coupon payments s
satisﬁes
vK ðx; k; sÞ ¼ eK ðx; k; sÞ þ dK ðx; k; sÞ; ð46Þ
where the values of corporate debt and equity are; respectively; given by
dK ðx; k; sÞ ¼ ðs=rÞð1@ðx=xdðK3klÞÞWÞ
þ min½ð1@aðKÞÞAðxdðK3klÞ;K3klÞ;Pðx=xdðK3klÞÞW
ð47Þ
and
eK ðx; k; sÞ ¼Pðx; k; sÞ þ pðk;K3klÞ
@PðxdðK3klÞ;K3kl ; sÞðx=xdðK3klÞÞW
þ max½ð1@aðKÞÞAðxdðK3klÞ;K3klÞ@P; 0
ðx=xdðK3klÞÞW@S: ð48Þ
In Eq. ð48Þ; the term pðk;K3klÞ accounts for the value of the options to reduce
ﬁrm size from k to K3kl and is given by
pðk;K3klÞ ¼
gl
ðg@WÞð1@WÞ
ðkðx=xlðkÞÞ
W@ðK3klÞðx=xlðK3klÞÞWÞ:
ð49Þ
When K ¼ k; the values of debt and equity are deﬁned as in Proposition 3.
Proof. See Appendix A. &
Proposition 9 extends Propositions 3 and 6 to incorporate the ﬁrm’s
decision regarding the pledging of assets. When K ¼ k, all the ﬁrm’s assets
are pledged as collateral to the debt contract and the ﬁrm cannot adjust
its production capacity to economic conditions. Thus, if @aðKÞ=@K ¼ 0 and
S ¼ 0, Proposition 3 holds and debt and equity values respectively satisfy
Eqs. (19) and (20). When K3kl ¼ kl ; @aðKÞ=@K ¼ 0 and S ¼ 0, Proposition 6
holds and securing debt does not aﬀect the investment policy of the ﬁrm
(asset sales and default decision). Therefore, vK ðx; k; sÞ ¼ vlðx; k; sÞ where vl 	
ðx; k; sÞ is deﬁned in Proposition 6. Finally, when K3kl ¼ K and S ¼ 0, the
values of debt and equity are given by Eqs. (35) and (36) with kl and a replaced
by K and aðKÞ.
Proposition 9 also shows that the default and contraction policies selected by
shareholders are aﬀected by the pledge that prevents the ﬁrm from reducing
capacity as soon as the production capacity reaches K . Thus, securing the debt
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contract changes ﬁrm value, optimal leverage and credit spreads. Denote
the coupon payment that maximizes ﬁrm value when K units of capital
are pledged as collateral by s*K and the coupon payment that maximizes ﬁrm
value when the debt contract is unsecured by s*l . The following proposition
results.
Proposition 10. When input parameter values are such that k > kl and the
instantaneous proﬁt function of the ﬁrm is described by Eqs. ð1Þ and ð2Þ; it is
optimal for shareholders to pledge k units of capital as collateral to the debt
contract; kA½kl ; k; if
vkðx; k; s*k ÞXvK ðx; k; s*K Þ; 8KA½kl ; k; ð50Þ
and
vkðx; k; s*k Þ > vlðx; k; s*l Þ: ð51Þ
According to Proposition 10, it is optimal to issue secured debt only if doing
so increases the present value of the cash ﬂows that both bondholders and
shareholders receive. Thus, to understand the decision of the ﬁrm regarding the
pledging of collateral, the impact of the security provision on both the market
values of corporate securities and shareholders’ default decision must be
determined. For doing so, the abandonment value of the ﬁrm must be speciﬁed
further.
Proposition 11. Assume that the abandonment value of the ﬁrm equals the unlevered
value of the ﬁrm’s assets. The values of debt and equity; respectively; satisfy
dK ðx; k; sÞ ¼
s
r
ð1@ðx=xdðK3klÞÞWÞ
þ ð1@aðKÞÞAðxdðK3klÞ;K3klÞðx=xdðK3klÞÞW ð52Þ
and
eK ðx; k; sÞ ¼ Pðx; k; sÞ þ pðk;K3klÞ
@PðxdðK3klÞ;K3kl ; sÞðx=xd ðK3klÞÞW@S: ð53Þ
The default threshold selected by shareholders depends on the size of the pledge
and is given by
xd ðK3klÞ ¼
W
W@g
cþ s
raðK3klÞ1@g
r@gm@gðg@1Þ
s2
2
  1=g
: ð54Þ
Proposition 11 determines the impact of the security provision on asset
values. Consider ﬁrst corporate debt. Eq. (52) shows that the value of
corporate debt is equal to its continuation value minus a default premium. This
default premium depends on the default probability, bankruptcy costs, and
ﬁrm size upon default. Eq. (54) reveals that pledging K units of capital, with
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KXkl, reduces the default probability by decreasing default threshold. Because
the security provision also lowers bankruptcy costs and increases ﬁrm size
upon closure by limiting the strategy space open to the borrower, we have the
following result.
Proposition 12. Assume that there exists kA½kl ; k; such that vkðx; k; s*k Þ satisﬁes
ð50Þ and ð51Þ. Pledging k units of capital by securing the debt contract reduces
credit spreads on corporate debt and increases optimal leverage.
Consider next equity just after debt issuance. Eq. (53) reveals that securing
the debt contract reduces its value in two ways. First, pledging assets alters the
use of real resources and, hence, reduces the operating ﬂexibility of the ﬁrm.
Second, the security provision lessens equity value because it calls for
expenditures over the life of the contract that are ultimately paid by the
borrower. However, securing the debt contract increases the average lifetime of
assets in place and thus reduces the default probability. At optimal leverage the
ﬁrst two eﬀects dominate, resulting in a decrease of equity value.
5.3. Comparative statics
Table 4 displays simulation results associated with Proposition 11. In
accordance with the above discussion, the security provision raises leverage
ratios and reduces corporate spreads in comparison with Table 3. In particular,
in the base case environment the security provision raises the optimal leverage
ratio from 29.4% to 35% and, at the same time, reduces the corporate spread
from 84 to 54 basis points, numbers that are consistent with what is observed in
practice. When there are no costs of ﬁnancial distress, the model predicts a net
tax advantage to debt of 4.4%, which compares well with the 4.3% found by
Graham (2000). Also, as the price claimholders get from the ﬁrm’s assets upon
liquidation increases, the optimal size of the pledge increases. In particular,
when this abandonment price exceeds by 50% the price the ﬁrm can get by
selling its assets in separate pieces over its entire life, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to
pledge most of its assets (74%).
One can also observe that pledging part of the ﬁrm’s assets as collateral to
the debt contract always increases ﬁrm value. This ﬁnding is in accordance with
recent empirical studies reporting that most ﬁrms tend to borrow on a secured
basis (see e.g. Barclay and Smith, 1995). However, data in Table 4 along with
Table 2 reveal that pledging all the ﬁrm’s assets can result in a large decrease in
ﬁrm value. As mentioned earlier, the security provision reduces not only the
interest rate the ﬁrm has to pay to the lender but also the operating ﬂexibility of
the ﬁrm. In the base case environment, the decrease in ﬁrm value reaches about
11%. When the productivity of assets in place is lower, the security provision
induces more overinvestment in unproductive assets and the decrease in ﬁrm
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value can reach 25%. More generally, Table 4 shows that the optimal size of the
pledge depends on ﬁrm and industry characteristics such as the productivity of
assets in place, the marketability of the ﬁrm’s assets, and demand uncertainty.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the impact of asset liquidity on the values of
corporate securities and the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing decisions. I show when liquidity is
measured by the liquidation value of the ﬁrm’s assets, an increase in liquidity
increases optimal leverage and decreases the corporate spread. When liquidity
is measured by the selling price of assets over the entire life of the ﬁrm, asset
liquidity reduces the value of corporate debt by expanding the strategy space
open to the borrower. In a rational expectations model, bondholders anticipate
the decrease in the value of their claims and credit spreads are increased.
The model can determine the extent to which pledging assets reduces the cost
of debt ﬁnancing and distorts the ﬁrm’s operating policy. I identify two distinct
sources for the increase in debt value. First, the security provision prevents the
Table 4
Table 4 reports comparative statics with Propositions 11. Credit spreads are deﬁned by
CSðsÞ ¼ ðs=dðx; k; sÞÞ@r and are measured at optimal leverage. The net tax beneﬁt of debt is
given by NTB ¼ ½vK ðx; k; s* Þ@vaðx; kÞ=vaðx; kÞ. The base case parameters are set as follows: The
riskless interest rate r ¼ 6%, the initial size of the ﬁrm k ¼ 100, the productivity of assets in place
g ¼ 0:53, the tax advantage of debt t ¼ 15%, liquidation costs a ¼ 20%, the liquidation value of
unlevered assets L ¼ kl l, and the sale price of assets in place l ¼ 1. The proﬁt function is further
characterized by m ¼ 0:01; s ¼ 0:2; a ¼ 1; c ¼ 1, and x0 ¼ 1.
Input Optimal Levered Unlevered Net tax Credit Optimal
parameter leverage ﬁrm value ﬁrm value beneﬁt spread pledge
values ð%Þ vK ðx; k; s* Þ vaðx; kÞ ð%Þ ðbpsÞ K *
Base 35.0 134.7 130.8 3.0 54 38
g ¼ 0:50 45.6 145.5 139.7 4.2 47 53
g ¼ 0:56 26.2 131.4 128.7 2.1 62 27
s ¼ 0:15 41.5 140.8 134.9 4.4 34 45
s ¼ 0:25 28.7 131.0 128.5 1.9 78 30
a ¼ 0 46.1 136.6 130.8 4.4 74 43
a ¼ 0:6 26.3 133.1 130.8 1.8 48 31
l ¼ 0:8 47.8 124.1 118.9 4.4 52 56
l ¼ 1:2 24.0 154.7 151.5 2.7 55 27
L ¼ 0:5kll 30.8 134.1 130.5 2.8 66 33
L ¼ 0:75kll 32.8 134.3 130.6 2.8 62 34
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ﬁrm from selling assets and increases its value in liquidation. Second, pledging
assets reduces the default probability. However, by altering the use of real
resources, the security provision also limits the operating ﬂexibility of the ﬁrm. The
optimal pledge trades oﬀ these costs and beneﬁts and, as a result, depends on ﬁrm
and industry characteristics such as asset productivity and demand uncertainty.
Finally, the analysis also reveals that asset liquidity and security provisions may
help explain the leverage ratios and credit spreads observed in practice.
Appendix A
A.1. Value of the unlevered ﬁrm
The value of the unlevered ﬁrm is deﬁned by
vaðx; kÞ ¼ ð1@tÞE
x0
ZþN
0
e@rupðxu; kÞ du
2
4
3
5þ AðxaðkaÞ; kaÞEx0 ½e@rTxa ðkaÞ 
@ ð1@tÞEx0
ZþN
Txaðka Þ
e@rupðxu; kaÞ du
2
64
3
75
þ
Zka
k
lEx0 ½e@rTxl ðkÞ @ ð1@tÞEx0
ZþN
Txl ðkÞ
e@rupkðxu;kÞ du
2
64
3
75
0
B@
1
CAdk: ðA:1Þ
Because pð: ; k; sÞ is a borel bounded function, I can use the strong Markov
property of Ito diﬀusions (see Karatzas and Shreve, 1991, p. 82) to write the
third integral as
Ex0 ½e@rTxa ðka Þ ExaðkaÞ
ZþN
0
e@rupðxu; kÞ du
2
4
3
5: ðA:2Þ
The ﬁrst factor is given by (see Karatzas and Shreve, 1991, p. 197)
Ex0 ½e@rTxa ðka Þ  ¼ ðx=xaðkaÞÞ
W: ðA:3Þ
As a result, the value of the unlevered ﬁrm reduces to
vaðx; kÞ ¼Pðx; kÞ þ ½AðxaðkaÞ; kaÞ@PðxaðkaÞ; kÞðx=xaðkaÞÞ
W
þ
Zka
k
lEx0 ½e@rTxl ðkÞ @ð1@tÞEx0
ZþN
Txl ðkÞ
e@rupkðxu;kÞ du
2
64
3
75
0
B@
1
CAdk;
ðA:4Þ
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with
Pðx; kÞ ¼ ð1@tÞEx
ZþN
0
e@rupðxu; kÞ du
2
4
3
5
¼
ð1@tÞaxgk1@g
r@mg@ðs2=2Þgðg@1Þ
@ð1@tÞ
c
r
: ðA:5Þ
Consider next the value of the contraction options. pyð: ;kÞ is a borel
bounded function. Therefore, I can once again use the strong Markov property
to write the value of the contraction options as
Zka
k
Ex0 ½e@rTxl ðkÞ l@ð1@tÞExlðkÞ
ZþN
0
e@rupkðxu;kÞ du
2
4
3
5
0
@
1
A dk; ðA:6Þ
which reduces to
Zka
k
x
xlðkÞ
 W
ðl@PkðxlðkÞ; kÞÞ dk: ðA:7Þ
Because the selling price of assets does not depend on the state variable x, the
optimal contraction policy is deﬁned by
@2vaðx;kÞ
@k@x

x¼xlðkÞ
¼ 0; ðA:8Þ
which yields
xlðkÞ ¼
W
W@g
lðr@mg@gðg@1Þs2=2tÞ
ð1@gÞð1@tÞa
 1=g
k: ðA:9Þ
Replacing xlðkÞ by its expression in Eq. (A.7) gives
vaðx; kÞ ¼ Pðx; kÞ þ pðk; kaÞ þ ½AðxaðkaÞ; kaÞ@PðxaðkaÞ; kaÞðx=xaðkaÞÞ
W;
ðA:10Þ
in which
pðk; kaÞ ¼
gl
ðg@WÞð1@WÞ
ðkðx=xlðkÞÞ
W@kaðx=xlðkaÞÞ
WÞ: ðA:11Þ
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A.2. Fixed capacity and value of the levered ﬁrm
When the ﬁrm’s production capacity is ﬁxed, the value of equity satisﬁes
eðx; k; sÞ ¼ ð1@tÞEx0
ZTxd ðkÞ
0
e@ruðpðxu; kÞ@sÞ du
2
64
3
75
þ max½ð1@aÞAðxdðkÞ; kÞ@P; 0E
x0 ½e@rTxd ðkÞ : ðA:12Þ
This equation is similar to Eq. (A.1) and its solution can be derived using the
same methodology. The value of corporate debt is
dðx; k; sÞ ¼ Ex0
ZTxd ðkÞ
0
e@rus du
2
64
3
75þmin½ð1@aÞAðxdðkÞ; kÞ;PEx0 ½e@rTxd ðkÞ :
ðA:13Þ
The second term of the right-hand side of this equation has already been
computed. The ﬁrst term can be written
Ex0
ZTxd ðkÞ
0
e@rus du
2
64
3
75 ¼ ð1@Ex0 ½e@rTxd ðkÞ Þ
ZþN
0
e@rus du: ðA:15Þ
Finally, the optimal default threshold derived in Proposition 5 is obtained by
solving the smooth-pasting condition
@eðx; k; sÞ
@x

x¼xd ðkÞ
¼ 0: ðA:16Þ
A.3. Capacity adjustments and value of the levered ﬁrm
When bond covenants do not prevent capacity adjustments, the value of
equity is
elðx; k; sÞ ¼ ð1@tÞE
x0
ZTxd ðkl Þ
0
e@ru½pðxu; kÞ@s du
þ max½ð1@aÞAðxdðklÞ; klÞ@P; 0E
x0 ½e@rTxd ðkl Þ 
þ
Zkl
k
lEx0e@rTxl ðyÞ@ð1@tÞEx0
ZþN
Txl ðkÞ
e@rupkðxu;kÞ du
2
64
3
75
0
B@
1
CAdk:
ðA:17Þ
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This equation is similar to Eq. (A.1) and its solution can be derived using the
same methodology. The production capacity of the ﬁrm upon default can be
determined as follows. The sales curve that maximizes equity value is described
by a continuous function. This function is strictly increasing in the current
production capacity of the ﬁrm [see Eq. (33)]. The default threshold is also
described by a continuous function, which is strictly increasing in the current
production capacity of the ﬁrm (see Proposition 7). The existence and
uniqueness of ﬁrm size upon default results from the fact that we have
@xlðkÞ=@k > @xdðkÞ=@k and, for k > kl ; xlðkÞ > xdðkÞ. The production capacity
of the ﬁrm upon default is then deﬁned by xlðklÞ ¼ xdðklÞ.
A.4. Secured debt and value of the levered ﬁrm
When K units of capital are pledged as collateral to the debt contract, equity
value is given by
eK ðx; k; sÞ ¼ ð1@tÞE
x0
ZTxd ðkl3KÞ
0
e@ru½pðxu; kÞ@s du
þ max½ð1@aðKÞÞAðxd ðK3klÞ; ðK3klÞÞ@P; 0Ex0 ½e@rTxd ðK3kl Þ 
þ
Zkl3K
k
lEx0e@rTxl ðyÞ@ð1@tÞEx0
ZTxl ðyÞ
0
e@rupyðxu; yÞ du
2
64
3
75 dy:
ðA:18Þ
This equation is similar to Eq. (A.1) and its solution can be derived using the
same methodology.
A.5. Productivity of assets in place
The instantaneous proﬁt function described by Eq. (1) approximates the case
of a ﬁrm with a CRS Cobb-Douglas production technology and facing an
isoelastic demand curve. Consider a ﬁrm that produces output according to the
production function
q ¼ lLfk1@f; ðA:19Þ
in which L is labor, l is a productivity parameter, and 1ofo1 represents the
share of output going to labor. This ﬁrm pays a constant wage w and sells its
output at a price given by the inverse demand curve
p ¼ x1@yqy@1; ðA:20Þ
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where 0oyo1 and 1=ðy@1Þ is the price elasticity of demand. According to
this speciﬁcation, the share of proﬁts going to capital depends on f and y
through the following relation:
1@g ¼
ð1@yÞf
1@yf
: ðA:21Þ
Labor’s share of national income in U.S. postwar data has been relatively
constant over time at f ¼ 0:64 despite the increase in real wages (see, e.g.,
Kydland and Prescott, 1982). If y ¼ 0:5, the productivity of assets in place is
1@gD0:47.
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